Scholarly Influence

Christopher P. Chambers[*] and Alan D. Miller[†‡]

December 18, 2013

Abstract

We introduce a new class of measures of scholarly influence, which we term *step-based indices*. This class includes the prominent h-index, the publication count, and the $i10$-index. We show that the class of step-based indices is characterized by two axioms, consistency with worse scientists and consistency with better scientists. We also introduce a new index, the junior/senior-index, which is a step-based index that combines the best features of the h-index with those of the $i10$-index.

1   Introduction

In recent years there has been a significant growth in the use of influence measures: indices used to measure the influence of scientists in terms of citations of their work. The most prominent example of an influence measure is that of the h-index, developed by a physicist but now used in a wide range of scientific disciplines (Hirsch, 2005). We introduce new properties that, in our view, influence measures should satisfy. Surprisingly, these properties characterize a tractable class, which we term *step-based indices*. This class includes the aforementioned h-index as well as several other prominent measures.

Influence measures rank scientists in terms of two factors: the number of publications produced by a scientist, and the number of citations that each publication has received. A simple influence measure is the citation count: the total number of citations to all of the scientist's publications. Another influence measure is the popular h-index: the largest number h such that the scientist has at least h publications, each with at least h citations. Google has recently introduced a new influence measure, the $i10$-index, which is the number of the scientist's publications that have at

least ten citations each.[1] To illustrate these measures, consider a scientist with four publications, which have ten, five, four, and two citations respectively. This scientist would have a citation count of twenty-one, an h-index of three, and an $i10$-index of one.

Influence measures are related to journal-based metrics such as the Impact Factor, which measure the influence of journals, as opposed to that of scientists. The use of the Impact Factor has become increasingly controversial in recent years on the ground that individual articles should be judged on the basis of their scientific merit, and not by the journal in which they appear, and due to several noted shortcomings of the metric as a measure of journal quality.[2] Some of the criticisms, in particular those related to the limitations of citation data, may also apply to influence measures. We view these criticisms as a reason to strengthen our understanding of these measures. Whether for good and for bad, universities, government agencies, and other institutions have begun to use these measures as an aid in making decisions about tenure, promotion, and funding. The axiomatic approach that we employ can be useful in strengthening our understanding of these measures and of the decisions made by these institutions.

Before we begin to describe our properties, we need to introduce the concept of objective comparisons. In many cases, it is difficult to find purely objective criteria that we can use to compare scientists. For example, suppose that one scientist, Alice, has two publications, each with six citations, while another scientist, Bob, has three publications, each with three citations. Which scientist is more influential? Different methods may lead to different results. According to the citation count, it is Alice, with twelve total citations; according to the h-index, it is Bob, with an h-index of three.

There is one clear case, however, in which one scientist is *objectively at least as influential* as another scientist. This is when every publication of the latter scientist can be matched with a publication of the former scientist with at least as many citations. For example, consider a third scientist, Carol, who has two publications, each with three citations. Objectively, Alice is at least as influential as Carol, because Alice's top two publications have at least three citations each. Along these lines, we may say that Carol is *objectively at most as influential* as Alice. Similarly, we may say that Bob is objectively at least as influential as Carol, because his top two publications also have at least three citations each.[3]

---

[1] See http://scholar.google.com. The internet application "Google Scholar Citations" calculates these three measures for users of their service.

[2] See the *San Francisco Declaration on Research Assessment*, available at http://am.ascb.org/dora/.

[3] Implicitly, we assume that all citations should be counted equally. This assumption is open to controversy; for example, some might argue that citations from highly-cited journals should count for more than citations from lesser-cited journals. While we have chosen to give equal weight to all citations for reasons of simplicity and consistency with the literature, our results would apply in the more general case. We discuss this issue at length in section 3.1, below.

In figure 1, scientists are identified with a graph that shows the number of citations that each of their publications have. Thus Alice's two publications have six citations each (shown in figure 1(a)), while Bob's three publications have three citations each (shown in figure 1(b)). In the figure, it is easy to see that both Alice and Bob are at least as influential as Carol (shown in figure 1(c)).


Figure 1: Four Scientists.

Furthermore, one can see that Carol is the most influential scientist who is objectively at most as influential as both Alice and Bob. If Carol were to publish an additional paper, we would not be able to make an objective comparison between her and Alice, because Carol would have more publications (three) than Alice (two), but Alice would have more citations. Similarly, if one of Carol's publications were to receive an additional citation, we would not be able to make an objective comparison between her and Bob, because Carol would have a publication with four citations (while Bob's most-cited publication has three citations), but would have fewer publications (two, while Bob has three).

So there is a sense in which we can make objective comparisons, but it only takes us so far. Some scientists (e.g. Alice and Bob) are not objectively comparable. The point of an influence measure is to enable us to rank scientists when objective comparisons are not possible. That is, the measure should allow us to compare Alice and Bob. This is both a positive feature of influence measures (satisfying a need to compare scientists) but also a source of complaint (because one can always find a ground for criticism).

Although all influence measures are open to criticism, this does not mean that all are equally problematic. Some have more flaws than others; certain defects are relevant only in select applications and not in general. For this reason, a natural way to study these measures is to characterize them in terms of axioms, or properties that they satisfy. We introduce two such axioms on influence measures here; we believe that they are entirely new to this literature.

To describe our first axiom, consider the three scientists we have already described, Alice, Bob, and Carol. Recall that both Alice and Bob are objectively at least as influential as Carol. Because the influence measure should reflect the objective ranking, it should not rank Carol strictly ahead of Alice or Bob. However, objectively speaking, Carol is the most influential scientist who is at most as influential as Alice and Bob. So Carol should not be too far behind them — if she gets one extra citation or one more publication, we can no longer make an objective comparison between her and both Alice and Bob. As a result, we maintain, Carol should be considered equivalent to the weaker of the two. If Alice is ranked ahead of Bob, then Bob is equivalent to Carol; similarly, if Bob is ranked ahead of Alice, then Alice is equivalent to Carol. We can turn this into an axiom: for any two scientists, the one deemed less influential shall be considered equally influential as the best possible scientist who would be objectively less influential than both.[4] We call this property *consistency with worse scientists*.

To describe our second axiom, consider a fourth scientist, David, who has three publications, two with six citations and one with three (shown in figure 1(d)). David is objectively at least as influential as Alice, because Alice has only two publications, with six citations each. Similarly, David is objectively at least as influential as Bob, because while Bob has three publications, they only have three citations each. Consequently, the influence measure should not rank either Alice or Bob strictly ahead of David. However, objectively speaking, David is the least influential scientist who is at least as influential as Alice and Bob. So, for reasons analogous to those we described in the case of Carol, David should not be too far ahead of Alice and Bob — if he had one fewer citation (or one fewer publication), he would no longer be objectively at least as influential as both. As a result, we maintain, David should be considered equivalent to the stronger of the two. If Alice is ranked ahead of Bob, then Alice is equivalent to David; similarly, if Bob is ranked ahead of Alice, then Bob is equivalent to David. We can turn this into an axiom: for any two scientists, the one deemed more influential shall be considered equally influential as the worst possible scientist who would be objectively more influential than both. We call this property *consistency with better scientists*.

Our main result is that the two axioms — consistency with worse scientists and consistency with better scientists — characterize the set of influence measures that we call *step-based indices*. We can describe step-based indices in the following way. A *step*

---

[4]Implicitly, we assume that every combination of papers and citations is possible; for more on this assumption see section 3.2, below.

4

is a pair of two numbers, x and y, and describes a scientist with x publications with y citations each. For example, Alice can be described by the step $(2, 6)$ because she has two publications with six citations each. Similarly Bob and Carol can be described by the steps $(3, 3)$ and $(2, 3)$, respectively. David, however, can not be described by a step, as there is no pair of numbers which describes him in this way. Because David has two publications with six citations each, we may say that he *achieves* the step $(2, 6)$ but this does not describe him because he also has a third paper with three citations. Similarly, because David has three papers with at least three citations, we may say that he achieves the step $(3, 3)$, but again this does not describe him because two of those papers have six citations.

A step-based index is one for which there is an increasing set of steps, so that a scientist's ranking is determined by the best step she achieves. A scientist who achieves none of the steps receives the lowest possible ranking. For example, the aforementioned h-index is a step-based index defined by steps of the form (x, x), so that a scientist achieves the first five steps if she has five publications with five citations each, but does not have six publications with six citations each. The $i10$-index is also a step-based index defined by steps of the form $(x, 10)$ so that a scientist achieves the first five steps if he has five publications with ten citations each, but does not have six publications with ten citations each. The citation count is not a step-based index; while one must achieve either of the steps $(1, 2)$ or $(2, 1)$ to receive a citation count of two, neither is necessary.

Step-based indices are purely ordinal; they enable us to compare scientists but do not tell us the extent to which one scientist is stronger than another. However, there are several natural methods that can be used to assign cardinal scores to scientists. Perhaps the simplest such method (used by most of the indices that we describe in Figure 1) is to assign a score of zero to the weakest possible scientist, and a score of n to the scientist who achieves the first n steps.

Four step-based indices are pictured in Figure 2: the h-index, the $i10$-index, the maximum-index, and the publication count.[5] In addition, three hypothetical scholars are represented by lines showing the number of citations of their n-th most cited publications. For example, scholar A has twelve publications, three of which have six citations each, three of which have five, three with three, and three with one. Scholar C, on the other hand, has eighteen publications, one with seventeen citations, one with sixteen citations, and so on. We wish to draw attention to a few features of this model. First, scholar C is objectively more influential than scholar A, but we can not make an objective comparison between either of them and scholar B. Thus no index should rank scholar A ahead of scholar C. Second, step-based indices are determined according to the maximal step which each scholar achieves. Thus according to the h-index, scholar C is the most productive, followed by scholar A, and with scholar B in last place. Under both the $i10$-index and the publication count, scholar B is

---

[5]One may note a relationship between the class of step-based indices and the set of monotone path solutions of Thomson and Myerson (1980).

ranked ahead of scholar A but behind scholar C. The maximum-index, which looks at the number of citations received by the scientist's most-cited paper, ranks scholar B (with nineteen citations) ahead of scholar C (with seventeen citations).[6]

One particularly interesting step-based index is the junior/senior-index. This index follows the h-index up to a score of 10, and then follows the $i10$-index for higher scores. The intuition is simple: it is rare for junior scholars to have a paper with 10 citations, and so the h-index is more useful at distinguishing between them. For more senior scholars, the $i10$-index may be a more useful metric; a paper with ten citations may be considered influential enough to be counted. Of course there is nothing special about the number ten; in general what is important is that the step-path be concave.

Several prominent influence measures are not step-based. The g-index (Egghe, 2006) is the maximum number n such that the scientist has n publications with an average of n citations each. The w_1-index[7] (Woeginger, 2008b) is the maximum number n such that the scientist has at least n publications where the most cited publication has at least n citations and the j-th most cited publication has at least $n+1-j$ citations. The citation count is the total number of the scientists' citations. Citations per paper is the total number of the scientist's citations divided by the total number of that scientist's publications. The citation count has a simple graphical representation: it is the area under the curve as shown in Figure 3.[8]

The w_1-index satisfies consistency with worse scientists but not the consistency with better scientists axiom. This first axiom itself characterizes an interesting class, which we call *minimal scientist indices*. These rules can be described as follows. First, there is a set of reference scientists, each one objectively more influential than the last. For example, the first reference scientist may have one publication with one citation, while the second might have two publications, with two and one citations, respectively. Because they are objectively comparable, we can order them in a line. A scientist is judged by comparison to these reference scientists, according to the following method. Each reference scientist induces a equivalence class — the set of scientists who are objectively as influential as the reference scientist but not objectively as influential as the next. Because we can order the reference scientists in a line, the equivalence classes can themselves be turned into a ranking. One scientist is more influential than another if the former is in a higher-ranked class; two scientists are equally influential if they are in the same class. Clearly, every step-based index is a minimal scientist index, but there exist minimal scientist indices (such as that w_1-index) that are not step-based.

---

[6]The maximum index is part of a broader class of measures which count the citations to the k-th most cited paper. These measures are studied empirically in Hamermesh and Pfann (2012).

[7]There are several indices named the w-index; to distinguish we refer to the index by Woeginger (2008b) as w_1 and the index by Wu (2009) as w_2.

[8]The g-index, the citation count, and citations per paper all violate both of the consistency axioms.

(a) h-index

(b) $i10$-index

(c) maximum-index

(d) publication count

scholar a —   scholar b –·–   scholar c – –

Figure 2: Step-based indices.

7

Figure 3: The Citation Count.

Step-based indices are nice for several reasons. First they are very tractable; they can be understood and computed with very little effort. Second, the class of step-based indices is very flexible. Different step-based indices prioritize citations and publications differently, and a variety of step-based indices are available to suit different needs.[9] They can be used as a benchmark model in determining the productivity or influence of a scientist.

However, like all citation-based influence measures, the step-based indices are not intended to be an overall summary of a scientist, but rather a simple "ballpark" measure of how productive a scientist is at some given point. Presumably in tenure or promotion cases, the value of a step-based index (or of any other citation measure) should be used in accommodation with something else. The finer details of a scientist's career would obviously be important in evaluating a scientists' productivity.

Influence measures have been used in empirical work as a proxy for scientific impact. Early research focused on the citation count as a proxy for research quality in studies of determinants of researcher salaries (Holtmann and Bayer, 1970; Hamermesh et al., 1982; Diamond, 1986; Sauer, 1988) and of Econometric Society elections (Hamermesh and Schmidt, 2003). More recent research has moved beyond the citation count; Hamermesh and Pfann (2012), for example, has studied the impact of the maximum index and other related measures. Most recently, Ellison (forthcoming, 2012) has introduced a new family of measures, called the $h_{(a,b)}$-indices, which are claimed to be superior to the h-index in terms of assessing economists and computer scientists. When stated in ordinal terms, the $h_{(a,b)}$-indices are part of the family of

---

[9]There is a connection here to the index-egalitarian rules characterized by Moreno-Tereno and Roemer (2006) in the context of resource allocation. These rules prioritize resources (instead of publications) and welfare (instead of citations) in different ways. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this connection.

step-based indices.[10]

Like all measures, step-based indices are not without their flaws. One particularly egregious and relevant problem is what we call the "renaming paradox." Suppose that a scientist changes the title of their paper in response to comments by a referee. The paper had already been cited under an original title, and then receives more citations under the new title. A nice property of an index would require that whether we consider the paper as two distinct papers, or as one paper, would not matter. It is easy to see that all step-based indices violate this property. Indeed, the only indices satisfying this property are those that depend only on the total number of citations.

The renaming paradox has another implication. An article may be cited by both versions of a renamed paper. As a consequence, these citations will be double-counted. This problem will exist primarily in scientific fields in which extensive use is made of pre-print archives such as arXiv, RePEc, and SSRN.

This work differs from previous axiomatic studies of influence measures in two ways. First, most prior works have studied specific measures instead of general classes of measures. These include characterizations of the h-index (Woeginger, 2008b,c; Marchant, 2009a; Quesada, 2009, 2010, 2011), the g-index (Woeginger, 2008b,a; Quesada, 2011), generalized g-indices (Woeginger, 2009), the w_1-index (Woeginger, 2008b,c), the maximal-index (Woeginger, 2008b; Marchant, 2009a), the family of i-indices (such as the $i10$-index) (Marchant, 2009a), the publication count (Marchant, 2009a), and the citation count (Marchant, 2009a). Second, most of the existing characterizations are cardinal, while we employ an ordinal approach. We note three exceptions. First, the class of generalized Kosmulski-indices (Deineko and Woeginger, 2009) is closely related to that of the step-based indices; all generalized Kosmulski-indices are step-based but the converse is not true. The maximal-index, for example, is step-based but is not a generalized Kosmulski-index. In contrast to our approach, the axioms in the characterization in Deineko and Woeginger (2009) correspond directly to the cardinal structure of the rule. The second exception is the work of Marchant (2009a,b), which characterizes several specific measures and a class of scoring rules based on ordinal principles. More recently, Perry and Reny (2013) provides an ordinal characterization of a parametric family of citation indices.

Like Deineko and Woeginger (2009), Marchant (2009b), and Perry and Reny (2013), we provide a characterization of a tractable class of indices and not of specific indices. A tractable characterization is useful as it allows the economist flexibility in further pinning down rules. Here, one can immediately see what the imposition of other axioms implies. For example, a step-based index satisfies *symmetry* (Woeginger, 2008c) and *strong non-triviality* (Marchant, 2009a) if and only if it is ordinally equivalent to the h-index.

---

[10]Many of the empirical studies weigh citations according to the level of co-authorship of the paper, so that a scientist will only receive $\frac{1}{n}$ the level of credit for a paper with n coauthors. While we do not consider this issue in the present work, our model can be easily adapted to deal with this case.

The consistency with better scientists and consistency with worse scientists axioms are mathematically equivalent to the lattice-theoretic concepts of the join and meet-homomorphism (Davey and Priestley, 2002). Variants of these axioms were first introduced in economics by Kreps (1979) and have since been studied in a variety of economic environments (Hougaard and Keiding, 1998; Christensen et al., 1999; Miller, 2008; Chambers and Miller, 2011; Dimitrov et al., 2012; Leclerc, 2011; Leclerc and Monjardet, 2013; Chambers and Miller, forthcoming).[11]

2 The model

A *scientist* consists of a function $\mathbf{s} : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{Z}_+ \cup \{\varnothing\}$.[12] The quantity $\mathbf{s}(n)$ represents the total number of citations of the scientist's n-th most cited paper. A value $\mathbf{s}(n) = \varnothing$ indicates that the scientist has not written n papers. The function $\mathbf{s}$ must be nonincreasing, there must exist n for which $\mathbf{s}(n) = \varnothing$, and if $\mathbf{s}(n) = \varnothing$ and $n' > n$, then $\mathbf{s}(n') = \varnothing$. The total number of papers the scientist has authored is therefore given by $|\mathbf{s}| \equiv \max\{n : \mathbf{s}(n) \neq \varnothing\}$. The set of all scientists is written $\mathcal{S}$.

For $z \in \mathbb{Z}_+$, we define $z > \varnothing$. As a consequence, $\min\{z, \varnothing\} = \varnothing$ and $\max\{z, \varnothing\} = z$ whenever $z \in \mathbb{Z}_+$. We say that scientist $\mathbf{s}$ is *objectively at least as influential* as $\mathbf{s}'$ if $\mathbf{s}(n) \geq \mathbf{s}'(n)$ everywhere. We write $\mathbf{s} \geq \mathbf{s}'$ in this case. Using this definition, we can define two operations on scientists, $\vee$ and $\wedge$. By $\mathbf{s} \vee \mathbf{s}'$ we denote the objectively least influential scientist which is objectively at least as influential as each of $\mathbf{s}$ and $\mathbf{s}'$; that is, for each $n \in \mathbb{N}$, $(\mathbf{s} \vee \mathbf{s}')(n) = \max\{\mathbf{s}(n), \mathbf{s}'(n)\}$. Similarly, by $\mathbf{s} \wedge \mathbf{s}'$ we denote the objectively most influential scientist which is objectively at most as influential as each of $\mathbf{s}$ and $\mathbf{s}'$, that is, for each $n \in \mathbb{N}$, $(\mathbf{s} \wedge \mathbf{s}')(n) = \min\{\mathbf{s}(n), \mathbf{s}'(n)\}$.

An *influence measure* is a complete and transitive binary relation $\succeq$ on $\mathcal{S}$ with the interpretation that $\mathbf{s} \succeq \mathbf{s}'$ means that scientist $\mathbf{s}$ is at least as influential as scientist $\mathbf{s}'$. We let $\sim$ be the symmetric component of $\succeq$, so that $\mathbf{s} \sim \mathbf{s}'$ means that scientists $\mathbf{s}$ and $\mathbf{s}'$ are judged to be equivalent.

We define the following two axioms on influence measures:

Consistency with better scientists: For all $\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{s}'$, if $\mathbf{s} \succeq \mathbf{s}'$, then $\mathbf{s} \vee \mathbf{s}' \sim \mathbf{s}$.

Consistency with worse scientists: For all $\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{s}'$, if $\mathbf{s} \succeq \mathbf{s}'$, then $\mathbf{s} \wedge \mathbf{s}' \sim \mathbf{s}'$.

---

[11]The closest papers, in a mathematical sense, to the present work are those of Christensen et al. (1999) and Chambers and Miller (forthcoming), each of which imposes both of the join and meet-homomorphism axioms in the context of a ranking problem and characterizes rules which could be described as "path-based." Despite the apparent similarities, the domains are quite distinct, and the step-based indices that we define here do not have a natural counterpart in the other domain. While the formal problems are mathematically related, they are not related in an economic sense; the question of measuring economic efficiency studied in Christensen et al. (1999) and Chambers and Miller (forthcoming) and of measuring scholarly output are quite distinct.

[12]Here $\mathbb{N}$ refers to the set of natural numbers and $\mathbb{Z}$ refers to the integers.

These axioms are described at length in the introduction.

A *step-path* is a function $P : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N} \times (\mathbb{Z}_+ \cup \{\varnothing\})$ such that $n > n'$ implies that $P(n) \geq P(n')$. For a scientist $\mathbf{s}$ let $Z(\mathbf{s}) \equiv \{n \in \mathbb{N} : \mathbf{s}(P_1(n)) \geq P_2(n)\}$. A step-path *generates* an influence measure given by:

$$\mathbf{s} \succeq \mathbf{s}' \text{ if and only if } Z(\mathbf{s}') \subseteq Z(\mathbf{s})$$

The class of influence measures generated by step-paths are termed the *step-based indices*. Several step-based indices are described in Table 1. Examples of influence measures which are not step-based indices are given in Table 2.

Table 1: Step-based indices

Name	Influence Measure	$P(n)$ [**Step-path**]
h-index (Hirsch, 2005)	$\max\{z : \mathbf{s}(z) \geq z\}$	(n, n)
$h(2)$-index (Kosmulski, 2006)	$\max\{z : \mathbf{s}(z) \geq z^2\}$	(n, n^2)
$i10$-index	$\max\{z : \mathbf{s}(z) \geq 10\}$	$(n, 10)$
Publication Count	$|\mathbf{s}|$	$(n, 0)$
maximum-index	$\max\{\mathbf{s}(1), 0\}$	$(1, n)$
w_2-index (Wu, 2009)	$\max\{z : \mathbf{s}(z) \geq 10z\}$	$(n, 10n)$
junior/senior-index	$\max\{z : \mathbf{s}(z) \geq \min\{z, 10\}\}$	$(n, \min\{n, 10\})$

Table 2: Influence measures which are not step-based

Name	Influence Measure
g-index (Egghe, 2006)	$\max\{z : \mathbf{s}(z) \in \mathbb{Z}_+ \text{ and } \sum_{i=1}^{z} \mathbf{s}(i) \geq z^2\}$
Citation Count	$\sum_{i=1}^{|\mathbf{s}|} \mathbf{s}(i)$
Citations per Paper	$\frac{1}{|\mathbf{s}|} \sum_{i=1}^{|\mathbf{s}|} \mathbf{s}(i)$
w_1-index	$\max\{z : \mathbf{s}(i) \geq z + 1 - i \text{ for all } i \leq z\}$

Our main result comes next.

Theorem 1. *An influence measure is a step-based index if and only if it satisfies consistency with better scientists and consistency with worse scientists. Furthermore, the two axioms are independent.*

3 Discussion

3.1 Unequal treatment of citations

In this note we have implicitly assumed that all citations should be counted equally. This assumption is open to criticism on the grounds that not all journals are equal—some are considered to be more "prestigious" or "influential" according to certain criteria, such as the difficulty of acceptance or the extent to which papers in the journals are cited. Arguably, a citation from a more heavily cited journal should be a greater signal of influence than a citation from a less cited journal. (However, a citation in a more heavily cited journal is more likely to lead to additional citations, so one should be careful not to over count the influence of an article. The extent to which a citation is likely to lead to other citations may depend on citation practices within the relevant scientific community.)

To adjust the model to account for journal differences, we simply need to let $\mathbf{s}(n)$ be the weighted number of citations, where the weights are taken from a cardinal measure of journal influence such as the impact factor or the PageRank method characterized by Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004). In this case, our basic characterization of step-based influences measures will still hold; however, if the journal weights are not integers, then it will be necessary to replace the set of non-negative integers $\mathbb{Z}_+$ with a set that includes all possible scores.[13] Citations may also be weighted by other means; for example, citations might count more if they come from papers that were heavily cited or that cited relatively few papers.

Weighting citations may affect the strategic incentives of the authors and journal editors in several ways. First, if all citations are counted equally, authors will have an increased strategic incentive to write papers that they expect to be heavily cited in relatively uninfluential journals. If citations are weighted according to a cardinal journal influence measure such as the impact factor, scholars within a research field may have an incentive to boost citations per paper within the field. Journal editors may pressure authors to increase the length of their reference lists.

To counteract this latter problem, and to make the citation measure comparable across disciplines, one may weigh citations of an article according to the journal in which the original paper was published. For example, a paper published in a law journal may expect to be cited more heavily than a paper published in an economics journal because of a difference in citation practices within the two academic communities. One might normalize the citation count by the average number of citations contained within articles published in the journal.[14]

It is possible to measure the influence of scientists (or of individual articles, or of journals) using the PageRank method characterized by Palacios-Huerta and Volij

---

[13]As long as the set of journals is finite, it will be sufficient to use any countable set that is order-isomorphic to $\mathbb{N}$.

[14]This intuition motivates Property 1 in Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004).

(2004). One advantage of using a step-based index instead of the PageRank method is that the latter method is difficult to compute in the case of authors. While PageRank may be a reasonable method to estimate the influence of journals, the use of the method to estimate author influence involves much more data—specifically, the number of times that each author has been cited by every other author. Step-based indices, by contrast, are easily computable; an author who wishes to compute her score only needs to know the number of citations that her papers have received.

3.2 The domain of scientists

We assume that every possible scientist may exist; i.e. every portfolio of papers and citations is theoretically achievable. This assumption may be limited. It is possible, for example, to place an upper bound on the set of possible scientists; however, this would mean that there would be a maximum possible score that a scientist could possibly achieve. Our proof does not depend upon the possibility that a scientist could exist who is far better than any other scientist, but only upon the possibility that a scientist could be objectively as influential as all existing scientists.

4 Conclusion

We have introduced a new class of scholarly influence measures, which we term the step-based indices. This class includes the popular h-index as well as several other interesting measures, such as Google's $i10$-index, the publication count, and the maximum-index. Step-based indices are characterized by two axioms, consistency with better scientists and consistency with worse scientists.

In the setting that we study, the only relevant information about a scientist is the set of papers that he or she has published. However, it is important to note that the scientist in our model is not simply a collection of publications. It is a collection of publications without reference to their titles, subject matter, or the names of the journals in which they are published. What is relevant is only the number of other papers which cite them. This assumption may seem rather limiting. However, in a certain sense, this other information should be irrelevant in determining the *influence*, as opposed to the importance, of the scientist.

All influence measures are subject to the problem of strategic behavior, in the sense that scientists may try to meet the index. For example, the maximum-index could discourage scholars from writing potentially valuable papers for a smaller audience. The publication count, on the other hand, could encourage scholars to write papers that will never be read. The use of citation measures generally (and the citation count specifically) increases authors' incentives to self-cite. A natural problem would be to ask which measures lead to less distortion of incentives. We speculate that the h-index may do well in this regard.

5 Appendix

Proof of Theorem 1. That any step-based index satisfies the two axioms is immediate. We shall prove the converse direction. Let $\succeq$ satisfy the two axioms. Each of the two consistency axioms directly implies that $\succeq$ is *monotonic:* if $\mathbf{s} \geq \mathbf{s}'$, then $\mathbf{s} \succeq \mathbf{s}'$.

We claim that for every $\mathbf{s} \in \mathcal{S}$, there is minimal scientist $\mathbf{s}^m \in \mathcal{S}$ such that $\mathbf{s}' \succeq \mathbf{s}$ if and only if $\mathbf{s}' \geq \mathbf{s}^m$. To see this, let $\mathbf{s}' \in \mathcal{S}$. Now, consider the collection $\mathcal{S}_* \equiv \{\mathbf{s} \in \mathcal{S} : \mathbf{s}' \geq \mathbf{s} \text{ and } \mathbf{s}' \sim \mathbf{s}\}$. Clearly, $\mathcal{S}_*$ is nonempty as $\mathbf{s}' \in \mathcal{S}_*$. Because $\mathcal{S}_*$ is finite, a repeated application of consistency with worse scientists implies that $\bigwedge_{\mathbf{s} \in \mathcal{S}_*} \mathbf{s} \sim \mathbf{s}'$. Define $\mathbf{s}_* = \bigwedge_{\mathbf{s} \in \mathcal{S}_*} \mathbf{s}$. Because $\succeq$ is monotonic, for all $\mathbf{s} \in \mathcal{S}$, if $\mathbf{s} \geq \mathbf{s}_*$ then $\mathbf{s} \succeq \mathbf{s}_*$. On the other hand, suppose that $\mathbf{s} \succeq \mathbf{s}_*$. It follows from consistency with worse scientists that $\mathbf{s}' \wedge \mathbf{s} \sim \mathbf{s}_*$, and therefore that $\mathbf{s}' \wedge \mathbf{s} \in \mathcal{S}_*$. As a consequence, $\mathbf{s} \geq \mathbf{s}' \wedge \mathbf{s} \geq \mathbf{s}_*$.

Let $\mathcal{S}_m \equiv \{\mathbf{s}' \in \mathcal{S} : \mathbf{s} \geq \mathbf{s}' \text{ if and only if } \mathbf{s} \succeq \mathbf{s}' \text{ for all } \mathbf{s} \in \mathcal{S}\}$ be the set of minimal scientists. It is straightforward that the set of scientists is totally ordered with respect to $\geq$; otherwise there would exist two scientists $\mathbf{s}$ and $\mathbf{s}'$, such that neither $\mathbf{s} \succeq \mathbf{s}'$ nor $\mathbf{s}' \succeq \mathbf{s}$. It is also simple to show that scientist with no publications $\mathbf{s}^{\varnothing}$, defined by $\mathbf{s}^{\varnothing}(n) = \varnothing$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$, is a member of this set. We can index the scientists in $\mathcal{S}_m$ so that $\mathbf{s}_0 \equiv \mathbf{s}^{\varnothing}$ and such that $\mathbf{s}_k \equiv \bigwedge (\mathcal{S}_m \setminus \mathbf{s}_{k-1})$.

Define, for a point $(x, y) \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{Z}_+$, the function $\mathbf{s}_{(x,y)}(w) = y$ if $w \leq x$ and $\mathbf{s}_{(x,y)}(w) = \varnothing$ otherwise. We claim that for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$, $\mathbf{s}_n = \mathbf{s}_{(P_1(n), P_2(n))}$ for some pair $(P_1(n), P_2(n))$. To see this, let $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and suppose that the claim is false for this n. Because $\mathbf{s}_n(1) \geq 0$ the finite set $\{(x, y) : \mathbf{s}_n(x) \geq y\} \neq \varnothing$ and therefore we can define $\mathbf{s}_n = \bigvee_{\{(x,y):\mathbf{s}_n(x) \geq y\}} \mathbf{s}_{(x,y)}$. Furthermore, since we assume that there is no (x, y) for which $\mathbf{s}_n = \mathbf{s}_{(x,y)}$, it follows that if $\mathbf{s}_n(x) \geq y$, then $\mathbf{s}_n \succ \mathbf{s}_{(x,y)}$. As a consequence, a repeated application of the consistency with better scientists axiom implies that $\mathbf{s}_n \succ \bigvee_{(x,y):\mathbf{s}_n(x) \geq y} \mathbf{s}_{(x,y)} = \mathbf{s}_n$, a contradiction. This allows us to define $P(n) = (P_1(n), P_2(n))$. By construction, $n \geq n'$ implies that $s_n \geq s_{n'}$ and therefore that $P(n) \geq P(n')$.

Thus, for all $\mathbf{s} \in \mathcal{S}$, there exists $z \in \mathbb{Z}_+$ such that $\mathbf{s} \sim \mathbf{s}_z$ and $Z(\mathbf{s}) = \cup_{i=1}^{z}\{P(i)\}$. Let $\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{s}' \in \mathcal{S}$ such that $\mathbf{s} \succeq \mathbf{s}'$. There must be $j, k \in \mathbb{Z}_+$, $k \geq j$, such that $\mathbf{s} \sim \mathbf{s}_k$ and $\mathbf{s}' \sim \mathbf{s}_j$ and therefore $Z(\mathbf{s}) = \cup_{i=1}^{k}\{P(i)\}$ and $Z(\mathbf{s}') = \cup_{i=1}^{j}\{P(i)\}$. Because $k \geq j$ it follows that $Z(\mathbf{s}') \subseteq Z(\mathbf{s})$. Conversely, assume that $Z(\mathbf{s}') \subseteq Z(\mathbf{s})$. Let $(x, y) = \max Z(\mathbf{s}')$. Clearly, $\mathbf{s} \geq \mathbf{s}_{(x,y)}$ which implies that $\mathbf{s} \succeq \mathbf{s}'$.

Independence of the Axioms: We provide two rules that do not belong to the family of step-based indices, each of which satisfies exactly one of the two axioms. This is sufficient to complete the proof.

Rule 1: Let $f_1(\mathbf{s}) = \max\{z : \mathbf{s}(i) \geq z + 1 - i \text{ for all } i \leq z\}$ and let $\succeq$ be the influence measure such that $\mathbf{s} \succeq \mathbf{s}'$ if and only if $f(\mathbf{s}) \geq f(\mathbf{s}')$. This rule satisfies consistency with worse scientists, but not consistency with better scientists.

Rule 2: Let $f_2(\mathbf{s}) = \min\{z : \mathbf{s}(i) \leq z + 1 - i \text{ for all } i \leq z\}$ and let $\succeq$ be the influence measure such that $\mathbf{s} \succeq \mathbf{s}'$ if and only if $f(\mathbf{s}) \geq f(\mathbf{s}')$. This rule satisfies consistency with better scientists, but not consistency with worse scientists. $\qquad \square$

References

CHAMBERS, C. P. AND A. D. MILLER (2011): "Rules for Aggregating Information," *Social Choice and Welfare*, 36, 75–82.

——— (forthcoming): "Inefficiency Measurement," *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics*.

CHRISTENSEN, F., J. L. HOUGAARD, AND H. KEIDING (1999): "An axiomatic characterization of efficiency indices," *Economics Letters*, 63, 33 – 37.

DAVEY, B. A. AND H. A. PRIESTLEY (2002): *Introduction to Lattices and Order*, Cambridge University Press, second ed., page 94, Lemma 4.17.

DEINEKO, V. AND G. WOEGINGER (2009): "A new family of scientific impact measures: The generalized Kosmulski-indices," *Scientometrics*, 80, 819–826.

DIAMOND, JR., A. M. (1986): "What is a Citation Worth?" *The Journal of Human Resources*, 21, pp. 200–215.

DIMITROV, D., T. MARCHANT, AND D. MISHRA (2012): "Separability and Aggregation of Equivalence Relations," *Economic Theory*, 51, 191–212.

EGGHE, L. (2006): "Theory and practise of the *g*-index," *Scientometrics*, 69, 131–152.

ELLISON, G. (2012): "Assessing Computer Scientists Using Citation Data," Working paper.

——— (forthcoming): "How Does the Market Use Citation Data? The Hirsch Index in Economics," *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*.

HAMERMESH, D. S., G. E. JOHNSON, AND B. A. WEISBROD (1982): "Scholarship, Citations and Salaries: Economic Rewards in Economics," *Southern Economic Journal*, 49, pp. 472–481.

HAMERMESH, D. S. AND G. A. PFANN (2012): "Reputation and Earnings: The Roles of Quality and Quantity in Academe," *Economic Inquiry*, 50, 1–16.

HAMERMESH, D. S. AND P. SCHMIDT (2003): "The Determinants of Econometric Society Fellows Elections," *Econometrica*, 71, 399–407.

HIRSCH, J. E. (2005): "An index to quantify an individual's scientific research output," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 102, 16569–16572.

HOLTMANN, A. G. AND A. E. BAYER (1970): "Determinants of Professional Income Among Recent Recipients of Natural Science Doctorates," *The Journal of Business*, 43, pp. 410–418.

HOUGAARD, J. L. AND H. KEIDING (1998): "On the Functional Form of an Efficiency Index," *Journal of Productivity Analysis*,, 9, 103–111.

KOSMULSKI, M. (2006): "A new Hirsch-type index saves time and works equally well as the original h-index," *ISSI Newsletter*, 2, 4–6.

KREPS, D. (1979): "A representation theorem for "preference for flexibility"," *Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society*, 565–577.

LECLERC, B. (2011): "Galois Connections in Axiomatic Aggregation," *Formal Concept Analysis*, 24–25.

LECLERC, B. AND B. MONJARDET (2013): "Aggregation and Residuation," *Order*, 30, 261–268.

MARCHANT, T. (2009a): "An axiomatic characterization of the ranking based on the h-index and some other bibliometric rankings of authors," *Scientometrics*, 80, 325–342.

——— (2009b): "Score-Based Bibliometric Rankings of Authors," *Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology*, 60, 1132—1137.

MILLER, A. D. (2008): "Group Identification," *Games and Economic Behavior*, 63, 188–202.

MORENO-TERENO, J. AND J. ROEMER (2006): "Impartiality, priority, and solidarity in the theory of justice," *Econometrica*, 74, 1419–1427.

PALACIOS-HUERTA, I. AND O. VOLIJ (2004): "The Measurement of Intellectual Influence," *Econometrica*, 72, 963–977.

PERRY, M. AND P. J. RENY (2013): "How to count citations if you must," Working paper.

QUESADA, A. (2009): "Monotonicity and the Hirsch index," *Journal of Informetrics*, 3, 158 – 160.

——— (2010): "More axiomatics for the Hirsch index," *Scientometrics*, 82, 413–418.

——— (2011): "Axiomatics for the Hirsch index and the Egghe index," *Journal of Informetrics*, 5, 476—480.

SAUER, R. D. (1988): "Estimates of the Returns to Quality and Coauthorship in Economic Academia," *Journal of Political Economy*, 96, 855–866.

THOMSON, W. AND R. B. MYERSON (1980): "Monotonicity and independence axioms," *International Journal of Game Theory*, 9, 37–49.

WOEGINGER, G. (2008a): "An axiomatic analysis of Egghe's *g*-index," *Journal of Informetrics*, 2, 364–368.

———— (2008b): "An axiomatic characterization of the Hirsch-index," *Mathematical Social Sciences*, 56, 224–232.

———— (2008c): "A symmetry axiom for scientific impact indices," *Journal of Informetrics*, 2, 298–303.

———— (2009): "Generalizations of Egghe's *g*-index," *Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology*, 60, 1267–1273.

WU, Q. (2009): "The w-index: A measure to assess scientific impact by focusing on widely cited papers," *Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology*, 61, 609–614.