Shiran Rachmilevitch

Published and forthcoming research

Disagreement point axioms and the egalitarian bargaining solution (2011), International Journal of Game Theory, 40, p.63-85.

A characterization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution by disagreement point monotonicity (2011), International Journal of Game Theory,  40, p.691-696.

Gradual negotiations and proportional solutions (2012), Operations Research Letters, 40, p.459-461.

Bribing in first-price auctions (2013), Games and Economic Behavior, 77, p.214-228.

Cooperative bargaining: independence and monotonicity imply disagreement (2013), Economics Letters, 118,  p.240-242.

Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions (2013),  Journal of Economic Theory, 148, p.1714-1725.

Bribing in first-price auctions: Corrigendum (2013), to appear in Games and Economic Behavior, with Maciej Kotowski.

Randomized dictatorship and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution (2014), Theory and Decision, 76, p.173-177.

First-best collusion without communication (2014), Games and Economic Behavior, 83, p. 224-230.

Efficiency-free characterizations of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution (2014), Operations Research Letters, 42, 246-249.

Bridging the gap between the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions (2014), to appear in: Contributions to Game Theory and Management, vol. 7 (Editors: L.Petrosyan, N.Zenkevich)

 

 

Working papers

Bribing in second-price auctions (2011)(R&R, Games and Economic Behavior)

Fairness, efficiency, and the Nash bargaining solution (2011)

Gradual Negotiations  (2012; a shorter version of this paper appears in Operations Research Letters)

Arrow’s Theorem without Transitivity  (2012), with Alan Miller.

Habit formation and distributive justice, (2014), with Dan Peled. (R&R, Social Choice and Welfare)

A characterization of the asymmetric Nash solution, (2013)(R&R, Review of Economic Design)

Disagreement in bargaining and the Nash solution, (2013; substantially revised version will be available soon)

The Nash solution is more efficient than fair, (2013) (R&R, Theory and Decision)

Games with countably many players, (2014)

The fairness-efficiency tradeoff in bargaining (2014)

 

 

CV