Published and forthcoming research
Disagreement point axioms and the egalitarian bargaining solution (2011), International Journal of Game Theory, 40, p.63-85.
A characterization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution by disagreement point monotonicity (2011), International Journal of Game Theory, 40, p.691-696.
Gradual negotiations and proportional solutions (2012), Operations Research Letters, 40, p.459-461.
Bribing in first-price auctions (2013), Games and Economic Behavior, 77, p.214-228.
Cooperative bargaining: independence and monotonicity imply disagreement (2013), Economics Letters, 118, p.240-242.
Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions (2013), Journal of Economic Theory, 148, p.1714-1725.
Bribing in first-price auctions: Corrigendum (2013), Games and Economic Behavior, 87, p. 616-618, with Maciej Kotowski.
Randomized dictatorship and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution (2014), Theory and Decision, 76, p.173-177.
First-best collusion without communication (2014), Games and Economic Behavior, 83, p. 224-230.
Efficiency-free characterizations of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution (2014), Operations Research Letters, 42, 246-249.
Bridging the gap between the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions (2014), Contributions to Game Theory and Management, vol. 7, p. 300-312. (Editors: L.Petrosyan, N.Zenkevich)
The Nash solution is more utilitarian than egalitarian, forthcoming in Theory and Decision.
A characterization of the asymmetric Nash solution (2015), Review of Economic Design, 19, p.167-171.
Nash bargaining with (almost) no rationality (2015), Mathematical Social Sciences, 76, 107-109.
Symmetry and approximate equilibria in games with countably many players, forthcoming in International Journal of Game Theory.
Egalitarian-utilitarian bounds in Nash’s bargaining problem, forthcoming in Theory and Decision.
Bribing in second-price auctions (2015), Games and Economic Behavior, 92, 191-205.
Working papers (the list will be updated soon)
Gradual Negotiations (2012; a shorter version of this paper appears in Operations Research Letters)
Arrow’s Theorem without Transitivity (2012), with Alan Miller.
Habit formation and distributive justice, (2014), with Dan Peled.