Published and forthcoming research
Disagreement point axioms and the egalitarian bargaining solution (2011), International Journal of Game Theory, 40, p.63-85.
A characterization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution by disagreement point monotonicity (2011), International Journal of Game Theory, 40, p.691-696.
Gradual negotiations and proportional solutions (2012), Operations Research Letters, 40, p.459-461.
Bribing in first-price auctions (2013), Games and Economic Behavior, 77, p.214-228.
Cooperative bargaining: independence and monotonicity imply disagreement (2013), Economics Letters, 118, p.240-242.
Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions (2013), Journal of Economic Theory, 148, p.1714-1725.
Bribing in first-price auctions: Corrigendum (2013), Games and Economic Behavior, 87, p. 616-618, with Maciej Kotowski.
Randomized dictatorship and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution (2014), Theory and Decision, 76, p.173-177.
First-best collusion without communication (2014), Games and Economic Behavior, 83, p. 224-230.
Efficiency-free characterizations of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution (2014), Operations Research Letters, 42, 246-249.
Bridging the gap between the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions (2014), Contributions to Game Theory and Management, vol. 7, p. 300-312. (Editors: L.Petrosyan, N.Zenkevich)
The Nash solution is more utilitarian than egalitarian, forthcoming in Theory and Decision.
A characterization of the asymmetric Nash solution (2015), Review of Economic Design, 19, p.167-171.
Nash bargaining with (almost) no rationality, forthcoming in Mathematical Social Sciences.
Symmetry and approximate equilibria in games with countably many players, forthcoming in International Journal of Game Theory.
Working papers (the list will be updated soon)
Bribing in second-price auctions (2011)(R&R, Games and Economic Behavior)
Gradual Negotiations (2012; a shorter version of this paper appears in Operations Research Letters)
Arrow’s Theorem without Transitivity (2012), with Alan Miller.
Habit formation and distributive justice, (2014), with Dan Peled.