Dr. Shiran Rachmilevitch
Published and forthcoming research
Disagreement point axioms and the egalitarian bargaining solution (2011), International Journal of Game Theory, 40, p.63-85.
A characterization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution by disagreement point monotonicity (2011), International Journal of Game Theory, 40, p.691-696.
Gradual negotiations and proportional solutions (2012), Operations Research Letters, 40, p.459-461.
Bribing in first-price auctions (2013), Games and Economic Behavior, 77, p.214-228.
Cooperative bargaining: independence and monotonicity imply disagreement (2013), Economics Letters, 118, p.240-242.
Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions (2013), Journal of Economic Theory, 148, p.1714-1725.
Bribing in first-price auctions: Corrigendum (2013), to appear in Games and Economic Behavior, with Maciej Kotowski.
Randomized dictatorship and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution (2014), Theory and Decision, 76, p.173-177.
First-best collusion without communication (2014), Games and Economic Behavior, 83, p. 224-230.
Bribing in second-price auctions (2011)(R&R, Games and Economic Behavior)
Fairness, efficiency, and the Nash bargaining solution (2011) (R&R, Social Choice and Welfare)
Gradual Negotiations (2012; a shorter version of this paper appears in Operations Research Letters)
Arrow’s Theorem without Transitivity (2012), with Alan Miller.
Efficiency-free characterizations of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution (2014)( R&R, Operations Research Letters)
Habit formation and distributive justice, (2014), with Dan Peled.
A characterization of the asymmetric Nash solution, (2013)(R&R, Review of Economic Design)
The Nash solution is more efficient than fair, (2013)(R&R, Theory and Decision)